IEMC Summary Report

McHenry County, IL | August 21-24, 2017

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

FEMA

Summary Report | McHenry County, IL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Course Overview

Preparing Communities for a Complex Coordinated Attack (CCA) is a scenario-based course for jurisdictions to identify their capability gaps in intelligence and information sharing, interdiction and disruption, operational communications, operational coordination, public health and medical services, public information and warning, and situational assessment when confronted with a CCA. It is a four-day, workshop-style program where participants spend a majority of the course discussing the response to a jurisdiction-specific, CCA scenario in three breakout groups (BOGs): Senior Command, Operations, and Community/Medical.

Course Goals

- Discover gaps in current operational capabilities for a complex incident.
- Organize gaps into a framework for further action.
- Recognize the vulnerabilities of interdependent emergency response and critical infrastructure systems in a complex incident.
- Improve cooperation between and across agencies and jurisdictions.

Scenario

On the afternoon of July 3, 2018, there are protests related to immigration outside of the McHenry 14th Congressional District Office. This is followed by dozens of inmates at the McHenry County Adult Correctional Facility falling ill. Then two men drive up and shoot at personnel in Crystal Lake Fire Station #1. There are then two shootouts in Lake in the Hills and Huntley and a judge is kidnapped in Marengo. The scenario concludes with a shooting at Centegra Hospital-Woodstock and a hostage situation at the McHenry County Courthouse. In total, there are 19 killed and 84 injured in 13 hours.

The workshop engaged participants representing a variety of different agencies and disciplines, as shown in **Figure 1.**

Legend:
- Law Enforcement
- Local/State Administration
- Fire
- Medical
- Private Sector
- Emergency Management
- Dispatch
- National Guard

Figure 1: Participants by Discipline

Summary Report | McHenry County, IL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Key Findings Overview

Participants self-identified gaps during their BOG discussions. These discussions were consolidated into key findings with the issues below receiving notable mention in the BOGs. The complete set of key findings begins in the next section of this report.

PLANNING

- There is a need for additional planning throughout the region in order to effectively respond to a CCA.

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

- The two-way flow of intelligence and information between local agencies in the region and the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC) is inconsistent.

PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING

- Consistent, unified public messaging will be a challenge during the response to a CCA or other large-scale incident.

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

- Rescue Task Force (RTF) or a similar model is not uniformly implemented throughout the region.

OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

- There is no platform to promote a common operating picture or ensure situational awareness among all relevant stakeholders during ongoing incidents.

Intelligence and Information Sharing   Operational Communications   Planning   Mass Care Services   Public Information and Warning   Operational Coordination

Figure 2: Number of Gaps by Core Capability

The gaps identified by participants were aligned with six core capabilities addressed during this workshop. **Figure 2**, above, is a word cloud depicting these core capabilities with the size of the word indicating the relative number of gaps that aligned with each core capability. For example, of the 42 gaps identified, 13 were related to Planning and five were related to Public Information and Warning.

Planning

Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or tactical-level approaches to meet defined objectives.

This section provides key findings associated with this core capability, recommended next steps, and trend data for gaps identified across BOGs.

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Planning

KEY FINDINGS

Figure 3 (below) depicts the number of gaps identified by participants in each BOG that are related to the Planning core capability. Planning includes findings related to personnel, equipment, and resources.


Figure 3: Number of Planning Gaps Identified by Each BOG

Planning

KEY FINDINGS

While each BOG separately discussed the CCA scenario, there were similarities in several of the gaps identified. These self-identified gaps were analyzed and combined to create the key findings below.

- **There is a need for additional planning throughout the region in order to effectively respond to a CCA.** This should include an effort to increase the baseline understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the McHenry County Emergency Management Agency (EMA). The region is also in need of an updated Terrorism Annex in the Emergency Operations Plan to include CCAs as well as additional recovery planning. (Finding P1)

- **Some public safety and emergency response personnel are unaware of all available resources in the region for large-scale incident response.** A National Guard capabilities brief delivered to McHenry County will increase awareness of resources available in the region. Regarding interstate resources, current Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) related to the use of force by law enforcement exist between one agency and one other interstate jurisdiction. Additional MOUs with interstate partners will be beneficial in order to maximize available, out-of-state resources. (Finding P2)

- **Conducting additional training and exercises related to an integrated response would be beneficial.** This includes participating in terrorism-related tabletop exercises on a more frequent basis within the county. Cross-training opportunities and annual joint meetings between police and fire should be explored and will improve the region's ability to respond to large-scale incidents. At the conclusion of real-world incidents, trainings, and exercises, all lessons learned and key takeaways should be communicated to individual agencies and departments. (Finding P3)

- **There is a need to establish triggers for Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activation during a CCA.** It may also be beneficial to establish triggers for activation during any active assailant-type threat. Following activation, information technology servers at the County EOC do not have backup systems in the event they are rendered unavailable. (Finding P4)

- **The patient diversion process in the region is inconsistently applied and not widely understood.** Specifically, there is a disconnect between senior leadership and operations-level personnel regarding the understanding of patient tracking, self-report management, and decompression systems and processes in the region. (Finding P5)

Planning

RECOMMENDATIONS/NEXT STEPS

While in BOGs, participants were encouraged to make recommendations or suggest 'next steps' for the community to address the gaps identified. These recommendations and 'next steps' are listed below verbatim by the originating BOG. Also included are recommendations and 'next steps' identified in Priority Matrix worksheets (Appendix C) completed by groups organized by discipline. The associated finding(s) are referenced following each recommendation or 'next step'.

SENIOR COMMAND
- Refer to coordinating council meetings [to increase understanding of the roles and responsibilities of county emergency management] (Finding P1)
- Refer to McHenry County EMA [to plan and coordinate additional tabletop exercises] (Finding P3)
- RTF, joint firefighting/law enforcement operations, and extraction teams should be considered for future trainings/exercises (Finding P3)

OPERATIONS
- The process for establishing server redundancy at the County EOC is currently underway (Finding P4)

COMMUNITY/MEDICAL
- Review and develop, as needed, plans, checklists, and resource cards for a CCA (Finding P4)

PRIORITY MATRIX WORKSHEETS (APPENDIX C)
- Develop standards for what leads to opening of EOC (Finding P4) (Fire/EMS)

Intelligence and Information Sharing

Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information concerning physical and cyber threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of WMDs; or any other matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland security by local, state, tribal, territorial, Federal, and other stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data, or knowledge among government or private sector entities, as appropriate.

This section provides key findings associated with this core capability, recommended next steps, and trend data for gaps identified across BOGs.

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Intelligence and Information Sharing

KEY FINDINGS

Figure 4 (below) depicts the number of gaps identified by participants in each BOG that are related to the Intelligence and Information Sharing core capability.

Figure 4: Number of Intelligence and Information Sharing Gaps Identified by Each BOG

Intelligence and Information Sharing

KEY FINDINGS

While each BOG separately discussed the CCA scenario, there were similarities in several of the gaps identified. These self-identified gaps were analyzed and combined to create the key findings below.

- **The two-way flow of intelligence and information between local agencies in the region and the STIC is inconsistent.** In addition to receiving minimal intelligence and information from the STIC, there is an inconsistent understanding in the region of what assistance the STIC can provide. There are also no classified facilities (e.g., Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities) in the county, presenting an obstacle to receiving classified information. (Finding IIS1)

- **There are information sharing challenges related to disseminating intelligence to non-law enforcement personnel, especially when information is designated as law enforcement sensitive (LES).** There is no clear method to communicate LES information with non-law enforcement personnel. As a result, relevant, non-classified intelligence and information is not consistently shared with fire and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel. (Finding IIS2)

- **McHenry County has limited capability to manage and mine intelligence gathered from social media.** Plans to expand monitoring capabilities should ensure that all relevant agency partners are receiving intelligence gathered from social media. (Finding IIS3)

- **The sharing of intelligence and information between disciplines is based primarily on informal relationships rather than formal policies.** Establishing a plan that outlines the intelligence and information sharing process across disciplines in McHenry County would be beneficial. This plan may also include establishing a county-wide communications network to disseminate important information to all relevant agency partners. (Finding IIS4)

Intelligence and Information Sharing

RECOMMENDATIONS/NEXT STEPS

While in BOGs, participants were encouraged to make recommendations or suggest 'next steps' for the community to address the gaps identified. These recommendations and 'next steps' are listed below verbatim by the originating BOG. Also included are recommendations and 'next steps' identified in Priority Matrix worksheets (Appendix C) completed by groups organized by discipline. The associated finding(s) are referenced following each recommendation or 'next step'.

SENIOR COMMAND
- Create a distribution list and establish criteria for information disseminated (Findings IIS1 and IIS4)
- Consult the Federal Emergency Management Agency for existing models [of documents outlining intelligence and information sharing processes] (Findings IIS1 and IIS4)
- Review inventory of available [social media monitoring] capabilities and assign responsibility (Finding IIS3)

PRIORITY MATRIX WORKSHEETS (APPENDIX C)
- Include hospitals/medical in the notification [and intelligence and information sharing] process (Finding IIS2) (Public Health/Hospitals)
- Meet on a monthly/quarterly basis with involved disciplines to map out [information sharing] processes (Finding IIS4) (Fire/EMS)
- Use WhatsApp for sharing information (Finding IIS4) (Fire/EMS)

Public Information and Warning

Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.

This section provides key findings associated with this core capability, recommended next steps, and trend data for gaps identified across BOGs.

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Public Information and Warning

KEY FINDINGS

Figure 5 (below) depicts the number of gaps identified by participants in each BOG that are related to the Public Information and Warning core capability.


Figure 5: Number of Public Information and Warning Gaps Identified by Each BOG

Public Information and Warning

KEY FINDINGS

While each BOG separately discussed the CCA scenario, there were similarities in several of the gaps identified. These self-identified gaps were analyzed and combined to create the key findings below.

- **Consistent, unified public messaging will be a challenge during the response to a CCA or other large-scale incident.** Multiple agencies in the region do not have the capacity to control rumors and disseminate public messages during a large-scale response. Developing a joint information system and refining the existing Public Information Annex with input from local municipalities will help ensure unified public messaging. Establishing a platform for developing unified public messages will complement this effort. The region would further benefit from increased coordination between municipalities for public messaging during special public events (e.g. July 4th). (Finding PIW1)

Public Information and Warning

RECOMMENDATIONS/NEXT STEPS

While in BOGs, participants were encouraged to make recommendations or suggest 'next steps' for the community to address the gaps identified. These recommendations and 'next steps' are listed below verbatim by the originating BOG. Also included are recommendations and 'next steps' identified in Priority Matrix worksheets (Appendix C) completed by groups organized by discipline. The associated finding(s) are referenced following each recommendation or 'next step'.

SENIOR COMMAND
- Resurrect Public Information Officer (PIO) group (Finding PIW1)

COMMUNITY/MEDICAL
- Develop a regional, public communications plan (utilizing existing capabilities such as 211 and flood websites) that addresses situational awareness needs and centralizes information (tip line information, traffic management information, reunification, guidance, hospital closures, etc.) (Finding PIW1)
- Develop and socialize an incident notification plan for county employees that addresses situational awareness and triggers for call back and Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government protocols (Finding PIW1)
- Develop and implement a regional incident action plan that includes triggers and standardized messaging for event cancellations or delays (Finding PIW1)

PRIORITY MATRIX WORKSHEETS (APPENDIX C)
- Create protocols with input from relevant stakeholders for shelter-in-place messaging (Finding PIW1) (Public Health/Hospitals)

Operational Coordination

Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

This section provides key findings associated with this core capability, recommended next steps, and trend data for gaps identified across BOGs.

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Operational Coordination

KEY FINDINGS

Figure 6 (below) depicts the number of gaps identified by participants in each BOG that are related to the Operational Coordination core capability.

Figure 6: Number of Operational Coordination Gaps Identified by Each BOG

Operational Coordination

KEY FINDINGS

While each BOG separately discussed the CCA scenario, there were similarities in several of the gaps identified. These self-identified gaps were analyzed and combined to create the key findings below.

- **RTF or a similar model is not uniformly implemented throughout the region.** There is a need for all jurisdictions in the region to standardize the implementation of the RTF model as well as associated equipment and training. Policies related to high threat operations should also be standardized across Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) and Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) to ensure that all mutual aid resources are operating under the same procedures, training, and equipment. Adopting Tactical Emergency Casualty Care guidelines will also assist with providing emergency care to patients. (Finding OC1)

- **Self-deployment and over-convergence will be a challenge during the response to a CCA.** There are no formal policies related to over-convergence among some law enforcement agencies in the region. Addressing procedures and accountability systems related to self-deployment challenges during large-scale incidents would be beneficial. Similarly, the process for recalling off-duty personnel relies on informal channels and may compound self-deployment challenges. (Finding OC2)

- **There is no capability to perform fire suppression activities in a warm zone.** Similarly, there is no formalized process for changing security posture among fire departments in the region following incidents targeting first responders. (Finding OC3)

- **The response time associated with mutual aid resources may not meet the expectations of public safety personnel in the region during a large-scale incident.** During a cascading incident, the primary challenge related to responding MABAS and ILEAS resources will be the time it takes for assets to reach the incident sites. This time constraint will increase as the incident grows. Emergency personnel should consider the time constraints associated with responding mutual aid resources and plan accordingly. (Finding OC4)

- **There is no standard protocol to perform an explosives ordinance disposal sweep of staging areas.** This creates challenges related to scene security and leaves first responders vulnerable to secondary attacks. (Finding OC5)

Operational Coordination

RECOMMENDATIONS/NEXT STEPS

While in BOGs, participants were encouraged to make recommendations or suggest 'next steps' for the community to address the gaps identified. These recommendations and 'next steps' are listed below verbatim by the originating BOG. Also included are recommendations and 'next steps' identified in Priority Matrix worksheets (Appendix C) completed by groups organized by discipline. The associated finding(s) are referenced following each recommendation or 'next step'.

SENIOR COMMAND
- Recommend McHenry County Chiefs of Police Association take up the topic [self-deployment challenges] (Finding OC2)

OPERATIONS
- Recommend that during localized incidents, the authority to create force protection teams should rest with the line-level supervisors (Finding OC3)

PRIORITY MATRIX WORKSHEETS (APPENDIX C)
- Training team to teach/educate at the fire houses and meet initially with fire command on education (Finding OC1) (Law Enforcement)
- Conduct policy review at each participating agency and implement in-house training on policy [related to self-reporting and accountability] (Finding OC2) (Law Enforcement)
- Develop mass notification policy and mechanism for local personnel [for recalling off-duty personnel] (Finding OC2) (Fire/EMS)
- Get information on dispatch "I am responding" to police/fire chiefs [regarding operational security] (Finding OC3) (Law Enforcement)
- Set up functional groups [to address notification procedures related to operational security concerns] (Finding OC3) (Law Enforcement)
- Adopt Lexipol policy for each department/jurisdiction (Finding OC3) (Fire/EMS)
- Fire to train/work with Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and armored vehicles (Finding OC3) (Fire/EMS)
- Contact Northern Illinois Police Alarm System (NIPAS) for mutual aid contracts [regarding officer involved shootings] (Finding OC4) (Law Enforcement)

Operational Communications

Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

This section provides key findings associated with this core capability, recommended next steps, and trend data for gaps identified across BOGs.

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Operational Communications

KEY FINDINGS

Figure 7 (below) depicts the number of gaps identified by participants in each BOG that are related to the Operational Communications core capability.

Figure 7: Number of Operational Communications Gaps Identified by Each BOG

Operational Communications

KEY FINDINGS

While each BOG separately discussed the CCA scenario, there were similarities in several of the gaps identified. These self-identified gaps were analyzed and combined to create the key finding below.

- **There is no platform to promote a common operating picture or ensure situational awareness among all relevant stakeholders during ongoing incidents.** There is also a need to identify an effective mechanism for sharing real-time critical information across disciplines. It would be beneficial to explore funding opportunities for tools, products, or platforms that build a common operating picture of an incident. (Finding OCM1)

- **There is insufficient communications interoperability between various agencies and jurisdictions in the region.** It is important to ensure that all disciplines can talk to one another during a large-scale incident response. Communications interoperability should also include non-traditional partners such as public works, critical infrastructure, and hospitals. Establishing backup systems will ensure redundancy in the event primary communications are unavailable. (Finding OCM2)

Operational Communications

RECOMMENDATIONS/NEXT STEPS

While in BOGs, participants were encouraged to make recommendations or suggest 'next steps' for the community to address the gaps identified. These recommendations and 'next steps' are listed below verbatim by the originating BOG. Also included are recommendations and 'next steps' identified in Priority Matrix worksheets (Appendix C) completed by groups organized by discipline. The associated finding(s) are referenced following each recommendation or 'next step'.

COMMUNITY/MEDICAL
- Develop an effective situational awareness tool/platform – potentially by adding functions to existing tools (i.e. FLASH reports) or repurposing existing data bases (revise data collection on forms and work flow) (Finding OCM1)

PRIORITY MATRIX WORKSHEETS (APPENDIX C)
- Evaluate and implement a common, county-wide backup channel for fire/EMS (Finding OCM2) (Dispatch/9-1-1)
- Explore secondary network for redundancy (Finding OCM2) (Dispatch/9-1-1)
- Create a formal policy to test interoperability of equipment and establish testing schedule (Finding OCM2) (Dispatch/9-1-1)
- Create a formal policy to test evacuation of Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) and establish testing schedule (Finding OCM2) (Dispatch/9-1-1)
- Identify fiber conduit for Next Generation 9-1-1 and STARCOM 21 (Finding OCM2) (Dispatch/9-1-1)
- Work with system providers (e.g. Motorola) to determine routes and any redundancy (Finding OCM2) (Dispatch/9-1-1)
- Avoid excessive use of acronyms and abbreviations in inter-discipline communications (Finding OCM2) (Public Health/Hospitals)

Mass Care Services

Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.

This section provides key findings associated with this core capability, recommended next steps, and trend data for gaps identified across BOGs.

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Mass Care Services

KEY FINDINGS

Figure 9 (below) depicts the number of gaps identified by participants in each BOG that are related to the Mass Care Services core capability.

Figure 8: Number of Mass Care Services Gaps Identified by Each BOG

Mass Care Services

KEY FINDINGS

While each BOG separately discussed the CCA scenario, there were similarities in several of the gaps identified. These self-identified gaps were analyzed and combined to create the key findings below.

- **Existing family assistance and reunification plans may be insufficient to address an incident that impacts multiple agencies and jurisdictions.** Updated plans should include considerations for psychological care of public and affected employees. (Finding MCS1)

Mass Care Services

RECOMMENDATIONS/NEXT STEPS

While in BOGs, participants were encouraged to make recommendations or suggest 'next steps' for the community to address the gaps identified. These recommendations and 'next steps' are listed below verbatim by the originating BOG. Also included are recommendations and 'next steps' identified in Priority Matrix worksheets (Appendix C) completed by groups organized by discipline. The associated finding(s) are referenced following each recommendation or 'next step'.

COMMUNITY/MEDICAL

- Develop a regional, coordinated plan for family assistance and family reunification – to include witness management, mass care (family assistance), and family reunification (Finding MCS1)
- Review existing plans to ensure mental health resources in the region are appropriately utilized and sufficient for a CCA event (Finding MCS1)

Appendices

Scenario, Activities, Report Methodology, List of Attendees, Acronyms

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Appendix A: Scenario
Exercise | Exercise | Exercise

ATTACK: JULY 3, 2018

1200   **McHenry 14th Congressional District Office:** Hundreds of people gather in front of the Congressman's office for a planned protest organized on social media. The protesters' intention is to exert pressure on local political officials to take a stand in support of immigrant rights.

1220   **McHenry 14th Congressional District Office:** The crowd continues to grow, and a group of about 100 individuals carrying signs with anti-government and anti-immigrant sentiments forms a counter-protest. Tensions escalate as members of each group yell insults at each other. Fights break out between the two groups and some property is damaged.

         Killed: 0/Injured: 19

1235   **McHenry 14th Congressional District Office:** Media outlets arrive at the scene as police disperse the crowd and arrest 25 individuals involved in the altercations.

1240   A picture of a bloodied, elderly man with the caption "This veteran was brutally beaten by pro-immigrant protesters in McHenry #TakeBackAmerica" circulates widely on social media.

1300   A woman posts on Twitter that she has transported three children who were separated from their groups and sustained minor injuries during the protest fights to the Centegra Hospital in McHenry. She provides a description of the children, instructing her followers to spread the message until their parents are located. Media outlets immediately pick up the tweet and it spreads quickly.

1315   **McHenry County Adult Correctional Facility:** Dozens of inmates at the facility have suddenly fallen ill with severe nausea and vomiting. It appears they may be suffering from a foodborne illness.

         Killed: 0/Injured: 28

Appendix A: Scenario
Exercise | Exercise | Exercise

1415   Media outlets are reporting that dozens of inmates at the McHenry County Adult Correctional Facility are suffering from a serious foodborne illness. They note that most of the patients are Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainees and speculate that the food may have been deliberately contaminated.

1520   **Crystal Lake Fire Station #1:** Two men drive up to the fire station in a black van and begin shooting at firefighters out of the vehicle's window. The assailants drive away heading east on Woodstock Street.

Killed: 1/Injured: 2

1522   The McHenry County Sheriff's Office is tagged in the following Facebook post: "The people will no longer stand for the oppression of this false government. 'It is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. – Declaration of Independence, 1776.'"

1525   **Lake in the Hills:** The Southeast Emergency Communications (SEECOM) dispatch center receives a garbled radio transmission from a Lake in the Hills police officer. They cannot make out what the officer is saying but hear gunfire in the background. Officers are dispatched to the scene.

1530   **Lake in the Hills:** Officers arriving on scene discover an officer on the ground outside his vehicle with a fatal gunshot wound.

Killed: 1/Injured: 1

1540   **Algonquin:** An accident involving a shipping truck is disrupting traffic flow on the Algonquin Rd bridge over Fox River.

Killed: 2/Injured: 4

1600   **Huntley:** A police officer calls for assistance after he is wounded in a gunfight after he is ambushed. He reports that one attacker is deceased, while the other fled the scene in a black van.

Killed: 0/Injured: 1

Appendix A: Scenario
Exercise | Exercise | Exercise

1745   **Marengo:** A family arrives at the home of their uncle for a planned dinner, a judge who recently decided in favor of the county on a controversial case involving land easements on farmland. They knock several times with no response. Looking through a window, they see signs of a possible struggle and call 911 immediately.

1755   **Marengo:** Officers arrive at the house and find signs of forced entry in the rear.

1830   **Marengo:** A media outlet gets a tip about the missing judge and begins to report on his possible kidnapping amidst targeting of first responders across the county.

1945   **Marengo:** 911 receives a report from a woman who witnessed two individuals sneaking into the barn adjacent to her property.

1953   **Marengo:** When police arrive to investigate a possible trespassing, they are shot at by an attacker from the barn window. One officer is injured.

             Killed: 0/Injured: 1

1955   **Marengo:** The uninjured officer returns fire. While he is engaged with one attacker, the other attacker pours flammable liquid throughout the barn. He then ignites it, causing a major fire as the two attackers flee out the back of the barn. The judge, unable to escape, dies from smoke inhalation.

             Killed: 1/Injured: 0

2015   Media outlets throughout the country report that McHenry is under attack. Within minutes, the attacks become the top trending topic on various social media sites.

2100   **Fox River Grove:** 911 receives reports of a major fire in an apartment complex.

Appendix A: Scenario
Exercise | Exercise | Exercise

2130   **Centegra Hospital-Woodstock:** A masked attacker storms into the hospital emergency room, demanding to be taken to the patients from the ICE detention center. He shoots at staff before being neutralized by a police officer.

         Killed: 13/Injured: 21

2200   **McHenry County Courthouse:** 911 receives a call reporting smoke and visible flames coming from the second floor of the courthouse.

2207   **McHenry County Courthouse:** The first unit of firefighters arrives on scene and prepares to make entry into the building.

2217   **McHenry County Courthouse:** As the firefighters advance to the fire floor, they are ambushed by two attackers with firearms. The attackers shoot several firefighters before taking the remaining uninjured firefighters hostage in a courtroom.

         Killed: 0/Injured: 3

2218   **McHenry County Courthouse:** Simultaneously, as other responders arrive, IEDs planted in trashcans and flower boxes outside the building explode.

         Killed: 1/Injured: 4

2220   **McHenry County Courthouse:** One attacker confiscates a radio from a hostage and says, "Your corrupt servicemen will now be tried for the sins of the government."

0100   **McHenry County Courthouse:** The mock trial of the firefighters is livestreamed on Facebook. The attackers question the firefighters regarding their role in a government that is tyrannical and corrupt. They state that the penalty for these crimes is death.

         Total Killed: 19/Injured: 84

Appendix A: Scenario
Exercise | Exercise | Exercise

INTELLIGENCE: MAY 2018 – JULY 2018

May 27, 2018
Media Report

Several media outlets report that multiple police cars throughout McHenry County were vandalized overnight. The reports indicate that the windshields were broken and tires were slashed. An individual associated with an anti-government extremist group was questioned by police about the incident and released.

June 1, 2018
Police Report

A local judge in the midst of a controversial case reports to police that an unknown individual threw a large rock at his home, which shattered his bedroom window. No one was harmed in the incident, and an investigation is underway.

June 15, 2018
Police Report

ICE conducts an investigation into allegations that a correctional officer at the McHenry County Adult Correctional Facility used excessive force against an immigrant detainee. The officer is placed on administrative leave during the investigation.

June 23, 2018
Media Report

There is continuing national coverage after the correctional officer is fired. National news media learns that the officer is a U.S. Army veteran. Veterans' rights groups stage protests throughout McHenry County in solidarity with the fired officer. Social media is filled with posts both supporting the correctional officer and arguing that his dismissal is justified.

June 24, 2018
Media Report

A controversial group announces plans to protest the alleged mistreatment of immigrant detainees at the facility. A Facebook page promoting the protest generates over 3,000 likes.

July 1, 2018
Fusion Center Bulletin

The STIC reports an increase in chatter suggesting that domestic terrorist groups may be planning attacks on emergency personnel and local public officials.

Appendix B: Priority Matrix

The following worksheet was prepared by law enforcement to identify their priorities, associated next steps, key partners, and capital investment required.

Priorities	Next Steps	Key Partners	Capital Investment
▪ Implementing an RTF model that involves police and fire	▪ Training team to teach/educate at the fire houses ▪ Meet initially with fire command on education	▪ Fire command ▪ Training team for RTF	No
▪ Communications plan or policy to notify fire personnel (and others? i.e. coroner, EMS, and dispatch) for their operational security	▪ Get information on dispatch and "I am responding" to police/fire chiefs ▪ Set up functional groups	▪ Communication/Dispatch ▪ Police/fire command	Yes (Minimal)
▪ Mutual aid packages for officer involved shooting and major investigations with other investigative multi-jurisdictional organizations (NIPAS)	▪ Contact NIPAS command for mutual aid contract	▪ McHenry County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) SWAT ▪ NIPAS	No
▪ Additional training on self-reporting and accountability	▪ Policy review at each participating agency ▪ Implement in-house training on policy	▪ Police command across county ▪ Dispatch	No
▪ Create, participate, and train on an Incident Management Assistance Team	▪ Complete process currently underway ▪ Review, evaluate, modify program when completed for our use ▪ Research needed	▪ Agency commands in county	Yes

Appendix B: Priority Matrix

The following worksheet was prepared by fire/EMS to identify their priorities, associated next steps, key partners, and capital investment required.

Priorities	Next Steps	Key Partners	Capital Investment
▪ Interoperable and inter-discipline information sharing – coordination of intelligence	▪ Meet with involved disciplines to map out process ▪ Monthly/quarterly meetings ▪ WhatsApp for sharing information (create multiple groups)	▪ Fire ▪ Police ▪ STIC ▪ Dispatch ▪ Communications ▪ Emergency Management ▪ Health Department	No
▪ Force protection policy for fire/EMS	▪ Lexipol policy adoption for each department/jurisdiction	▪ Each fire and police department/jurisdiction ▪ MABAS ▪ ILEAS ▪ State	No
▪ Mass notification policy and mechanism for local personnel	▪ Develop procedure through communications to notify	▪ Fire ▪ Communications	No
▪ Policy and training – fighting fire while under fire	▪ Fire works with SWAT/armored vehicle	▪ Fire departments (MABAS Division 5) ▪ MCSO	Yes
▪ EOC knowledge and activation trigger points	▪ Developing standard for what leads to opening of EOC	▪ Fire ▪ Communications ▪ Police ▪ Emergency Management	No

Appendix B: Priority Matrix

The following worksheet was prepared by dispatch/9-1-1 to identify their priorities, associated next steps, key partners, and capital investment required.

Priorities	Next Steps	Key Partners	Capital Investment
▪ Interoperable communications for fire between PSAPs	▪ Evaluate and implement a common county-wide back-up channel for fire/EMS	▪ Fire ▪ PSAPs ▪ Emergency Telephone System Board (ETSB)	Yes
▪ Method of timely notification to disciplines (I am responding)	▪ Needs assessment ▪ Create notification groups and policy ▪ Possibly look at secondary network for redundancy	▪ Fire ▪ PSAPs ▪ Police ▪ ETSB	No
▪ Formal policy to test interoperability of equipment	▪ Create policy and testing schedule	▪ PSAPs	No
▪ Formal policy to test evacuation of PSAPs	▪ Create policy and testing schedule	▪ PSAPs	No
▪ Identify fiber conduit for NG 9-1-1 and STARCOM 21	▪ Work with system providers to determine routes and any redundancy	▪ PSAPs ▪ ETSB ▪ State of Illinois ▪ Motorola	No

Appendix B: Priority Matrix

The following worksheet was prepared by public health/hospitals to identify their priorities, associated next steps, key partners, and capital investment required.

Priorities	Next Steps	Key Partners	Capital Investment
- Shelter-in-place decisions	- Create a protocol - ID stakeholders: jail, hospitals, EMS, and others - Communications corrections identified	- Jail - Hospitals - EMS	N
- Operational messaging	- Establish/create/utilize way to efficiently carry out - Look at systems that could help	- PIOs - Administration	
- Including hospitals/medical in the notification process	- Bringing everyone in - Where are hospitals in first response - Getting information to decision-making employee	- Hospitals - EMS - Fire - Dispatch	
- Understanding the message	- Use plain English (6th grade reading level) - No acronyms/abbreviations	- PIOs - Administration - Department heads - Hospitals	
- Intelligence sharing (Getting information from the STIC)	- What intelligence does your department need to know? - How is it shared? - Is our current system secure? - Trigger/notification to look at message	- All of the above	Possible

Appendix C: Resource Activity

Participants in the Operations BOG discussed resources needed to respond to each scenario incident. The results are included in the timeline below. The length of the bar indicates how long the incident is projected to last.

McHenry 14th Congressional District Office

- ILEAS Region 3 Mobile Field Force (25 PD on-site [1 McHenry City; 2 McHenry County; 1 Lake in the Hills; 1 Woodstock; 1 Cary; 1 Algonquin; 1 Crystal Lake; 2 Huntley], 2 supervisors [1 Huntley]) –Mobile Command Post from McHenry City - 4 ambulances (McHenry City) –Patient Transport van (3 COs) –MABAS 2nd alarm box (6 ambulances [Crystal Lake, Woodstock, Wonder Lake, Fox River Grove, Wauconda, Nunda]) –Crisis worker –PIO (McHenry County)

McHenry Adult Correctional Facility

- Jail Task Force (15-20 min) -3 correctional ambulances/buses - 3 ambulances (Woodstock Fire Dept.) (40-60 min) -25 officers (Kane, DuPage, Cook) – CERT team (40 min)

Crystal Lake Fire Station #1

-3 ambulances (Crystal Lake, back filled through MABAS, 15 min) - 1 engine - 1 ladder truck -10 PD officers -2 supervisors - 12 Major Investigation Assistance Team (MIAT) members -2 PD officers (force protection Crystal Lake #3 and #4) –Crystal Lake PD is resource exhausted –Crystal Lake FD nearly exhausted – Huntley PD is nearly resource exhausted –Hospitals in McHenry County are heavily taxed –Ambulance return to duty time delayed

Lake in the Hills

- MIAT is resource exhausted –State police – 1 ambulance (Algonquin) – 1 engine (Algonquin) –Lake in the Hills PD is resource exhausted

Algonquin

- 2 PD units to shut down bridge (60 minutes [Algonquin]) –Algonquin PD is heavily taxed – Algonquin FD is resource exhausted

Huntley

- Police and fire/EMS will consider force protection plan and make request to senior leadership - Huntley PD is resource exhausted - Kane County Major Crimes Task Force – 1 ambulance – 1 engine

Marengo

- 10 MCSO cars (resource exhausted) - Marengo PD is resource exhausted – Marengo FD is resource exhausted

Fox River Grove

- 10 pieces of fire equipment from out of county – Fox River Grove PD is resource exhausted – Force protection from Cook and Lake County PD

Centegra Hospital

- 4 Woodstock PD (resource exhausted) – SWAT

County Courthouse

- Woodstock FD is resource exhausted – MCSO midnight shift – SWAT team redirected from Centegra Hospital

| 1200 | 1315 | 1520 | 1525 | 1540 | 1600 | 1745 | 2100 | 2130 | 2200 | 0100 |

Appendix D: Methodology

Key Findings Overview Methodology

- The core capabilities with the most corresponding key findings are included in the Key Findings Overview section within the Executive Summary
- In the event that multiple core capabilities have the same number of key findings, the core capability which was discussed in the most BOGs is included in the Key Findings Overview
- Within the selected core capabilities, the key findings with the most associated gaps are included in the Key Findings Overview
- In the event that multiple key findings have the same number of gaps associated with them, an analytical determination is made based on the relevance of key findings during BOG discussion at the workshop

*Note: In some cases, the analytical judgement of the instruction team outweighs the methodology outlined above. This judgement is based on the relevance, frequency, and prioritization of certain gaps/key findings during BOG discussions.

Key Findings Methodology

- Key findings are developed by reviewing workshop outcomes including BOG discussions, gaps, and activities
- Related outcomes are then consolidated and grouped together to produce overarching key findings

Appendix E: List of Attendees

The following agencies, departments, and organizations participated in the course.

- Algonquin Police Department
- American Red Cross
- Cary Fire Protection District
- Cary Police Department
- Centegra Health System
- City of Crystal Lake
- City of Woodstock
- County of McHenry Illinois
- Crystal Lake Fire Rescue Department
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Fox River Grove Fire Protection District
- Huntley Police Department
- Illinois Army National Guard
- Illinois Department of Transportation
- Illinois Emergency Management Agency
- Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System
- Lake in the Hills Police Department
- MABAS Division 4 & 5 SRT Joint Administrative Council
- Marengo Fire Protection District

- McHenry County College
- McHenry County Coroners Office
- McHenry County Department of Health
- McHenry County Department of Planning & Development
- McHenry County Division of Transportation
- McHenry County Emergency Management Agency Office
- McHenry County Emergency Telephone System Board
- McHenry County Government
- McHenry County Sheriff's Office
- McHenry County States Attorney's Office
- McHenry Police Department
- Metra Police Department
- Northwest Central Dispatch System
- Richmond Township Fire Protection District
- Service Master
- Southeast Emergency Communications
- Village of Algonquin
- Woodstock Fire/Rescue

Appendix F: Acronyms

ACRONYM	DEFINITION	ACRONYM	DEFINITION
BOG	Breakout Group	MABAS	Mutual Aid Box Alarm System
CCA	Complex Coordinated Attack	MCSO	McHenry County Sheriff's Office
CERT	Community Emergency Response Team	MIAT	Major Investigation Assistance Team
CO	Correctional Officer	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
EMA	Emergency Management Agency	NIPAS	Northern Illinois Police Alarm System
EMS	Emergency Medical Services	PIO	Public Information Officer
EOC	Emergency Operations Center	PSAP	Public Safety Answering Point
ETSB	Emergency Telephone System Board	RTF	Rescue Task Force
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement	SEECOM	Southeast Emergency Communications
IEMC	Integrated Emergency Management Course	STIC	Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center
ILEAS	Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System	SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
LES	Law Enforcement Sensitive		